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Effects of the Patent Cooperation Treaty
extent to which the designated Offices will rely on the results of the international search, rather than conduct extensive supplementary searches in each
case. If the latter practice prevails, the applicant may find that the Treaty
procedure involves no real savings in cost or effort compared to traditional
foreign patent practice.
In summary, the Treaty procedure may ultimately prove its usefulness to
the applicant, not only by saving him money and effort in foreign patent
prosecution, but also by affording him the opportunity for more effectively
protecting rights in intellectual property abroad. The realization of such
benefits, without which the Treaty will certainly be rendered a useless gesture, can only be reached through conscientious efforts by the international
authorities to implement a reliable procedure and to utilize the results of the
international search to the greatest practical extent.
EUGENE L. FLANAGAN III

Legal Aspects of the
Space Shuttle*
Introduction
The Space Age is barely two decades old but the steps taken during that
time have created unparalleled opportunities for the exploration and use of
outer space. Traditionally, the law has been slow to respond to such opportunities, and the history of the industrial and technological revolution has
often provided justification for the charge that science and technology have
far outstripped the law.'
One of the latest challenges to the law has been the creation of the "space
shuttle.." This versatile vehicle has the essential characteristics of a spacecraft yet is, in some respects, similar to an aircraft. Now being tested for
projected operation in the 1980s, the shuttle ascends into outer space with
the assistance of rockets just as does the conventional spacecraft and de*The author is grateful to the ZEITSCHRIFT FUR

LUFT UND WELTRAUMRECHT

for their permis-

sion to reproduce materials which appeared in vol. 27, pp. 196-205.
'See the late Professor John C. Cooper's statement made before the American Society of
International Law, 50 PROC. AM. Soc'v INT'L L. 85 (1956).
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scends from outer space in a manner reminiscent of the landing of an
aircraft by gliding through the atmosphere and landing on a runway.
The development of the shuttle is a significant achievement because it
marks the advent of a rudimentary space transportation system.2 This system is expected to enable man and cargo to "shuttle" routinely to and from
outer space thereby making it possible to service, repair and resupply spacecraft, to build larger structures such as industries, and eventually to construct settlements in outer space.
The legal problems which may arise in connection with the use of the
shuttle are numerous but most of them are not unique to the shuttle. The
advent of the shuttle, however, places these legal problems in immediate
perspective. Within the limited confines of this assessment, an attempt will
be made to focus on the legal issues that are likely to present themselves as a
result of the inauguration of a space transportation system. These issues
may be conveniently discussed under four headings: (1)the legal nature of
the shuttle, (2) jurisdictional problems, (3) liability problems, and finally,
(4) problems of sovereignty and sovereign rights.
i. Legal Nature of the Shuttle
The issues pertaining to the legal nature of the shuttle, unlike some other
issues, are unique to the shuttle. Reduced to its bare essentials, the question
is whether the shuttle is an aircraft, a spacecraft, or both. The answer to this
question has far-reaching significance in both domestic and international
law. If the shuttle is an aircraft while in air space, it will be subject to the
rules of air law, domestic and international. If the shuttle is a spacecraft not
only in outer space but also during its descent through air space to earth,
then the rules of space law, domestic and international, would apply to it.
(a) Domestic Law of the United States
The question of whether the shuttle is an aircraft first arises under the
domestic laws of the United States. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958'
defines "aircraft" as "any contrivance now known or hereafter invented,
used or designed for navigation of or flight in the air." 4 This provision,
literally construed, might apply to the shuttle during the course of its descent through air space for landing. However, a close examination of legislative intent reveals that the Congressional drafters intended the law to

'For an analysis of some of the policy issues arising out of the space transportation system
POLICY RES. Div., CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERVICE, SUBCOMM.

involving the shuttle, see SCIENCE
SPACE SCIENCE & APPLICATIONS,
SESS.,

HOUSE COMM. SCIENCE

REPORT ON WORLD-WIDE ACTIVITIES

& TECHNOLOGY, 95th

18ff. (Comm. Print 1977).

'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
Id. § 1301(5).

CONG.,
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apply to conventional airplanes and not to rockets and spacecraft that
happen to pass through air space.'
Similar conclusions may be reached from reading the appropriate provisions of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.6 While the Act
does not define "aircraft" or "spacecraft" separately, it does identify "aeronautical and space vehicles" as "aircraft, missiles, satellites, and other
space vehicles, manned and unmanned, together with related equipment,
devices, components, and parts."' The phrase "aeronautical and space
activities" includes, inter alia, "activities as may be required for the exploration of space.' Although this last stipulation speaks solely in terms of
the "exploration" of space, the Congressional intent, as interpreted in the
light of legislative history and years of N.A.S.A. practice, leaves little doubt
that "use" and "utilization" are meant as well as "exploration." 9
From a functional viewpoint, the conclusion appears inescapable that
since the shuttle is designed to perform activities in connection with the
exploration and use of outer space, it is basically a spacecraft and not an
aircraft.
(b) InternationalAir Law
Upon examination of some of the major international conventions pertaining to air law, the following observations may be made: neither the
Paris Convention of 191910 nor the Chicago Convention of 1944" defines
the term "aircraft." Only in the annexes to these conventions is there a clue
to the meaning of this term. Thus, the annex to the Paris Convention
describes an aircraft as a vehicle that "derives support in the atmosphere
from reactions of the air." A similar definition is given in the annex to the
Chicago Convention.
The argument could be made that since the shuttle will operate only
briefly in that part of the atmosphere in which conventional airplanes operate, international air law should not be applicable to it. But it could also be
argued that, upon descent, the shuttle derives support in the atmosphere
from reactions of the air and that during that time it should be regarded as
an aircraft. The resolution of these conflicting arguments is of fundamental
importance. If the shuttle is considered an aircraft part of the time, the rules

'Cf. the authoritative statement of the Chief Counsel of the Federal Aeronautics Adminstration quoted in Dula, Management of Interpartyand Third-Party Liability for Routine Space
Shuttle Operations, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 741, 751 (1977).
'National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 426, 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (1970).
'd. § 103(2).

'Id. § 103(l).
'See Mossinghoff & Sloup, Legal Issues Inherent in Space Shuttle Operations, 6 J. SPACE L.
35 (1978).
"The Paris Convention of 1919, Annex A.
''The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation [signedon December 4, 1944, and
entered into force April 4, 19471, T.I.A.S. No. 944.

156

INTERNA TIONA L LA WYER

of international air law would apply to it, while the provisions of the 1972
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects' 2 would not. (Under the Convention, strict liability is established
where the damage is caused on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in
flight.)' 3 Before attempting to resolve the conflicting arguments as to the
status of the shuttle, it seems appropriate to look at the provisions of other
current space treaties.
(c) International Space Law
The principles of space law are incorporated in the Outer Space Treaty of
1967.'" Additionally, three other major international agreements have been
concluded: the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space;'" the
aforementioned Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects;' 6 and the Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched Into Outer Space.' 7 None of these conventions defines the term
"spacecraft." Instead, they use the phrase "space object." However, nowhere in the four international agreements is there a complete definition of
this phrase. There is only a partial definition stating that the phrase "space
object" includes "its component parts as well as its launch vehicle and parts
thereof."'" While this partial definition appears insufficient to determine
the legal nature of the shuttle, it has been suggested in space law literature
that a space object is any object which is designed or intended for use in
outer space.' 9 Under this definition, the shuttle would clearly be a space
object to which international space law, including the above noted international agreements, would apply.
The additional question raised by this conclusion is whether international
space law will take precedence over international air law where the two
conflict. It appears that the more recent international agreement applicable
to the parties would be controlling. In other words, with respect to states

121972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 24
U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter cited as the Liability Convention].
'"Id.art.
11.
"The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed on January 27, 1967 and
entered into force October 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 [hereinafter cited as
the Outer Space Treaty].
"The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599 [hereinafter cited as the Rescue Agreement].
"Liability Convention, supra note 12.
"The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480 [hereinafter cited as the Registration

Convention].
"See art. i(d) of the Liability Convention, supra note 12, and art. I(b) of the Registration
Convention, supra note 17.
"See S. GOROVE, STUDIES IN SPACE LAW: ITS CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 105-6 (1977).
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which are parties both to the air and space agreements, the space agreements, being the later of the agreements, would take precedence over the
international agreements on air law in the determination of the legal nature
of the shuttle.
Similarly, where American domestic law is concerned, the most recent
international treaty would take precedence over a previous one. It may be
noted that American courts apply the same rule to federal statutes, with the
result that the latest federal statute prevails not only over a previous statute
but, to the dismay of international lawyers, also prevails over previous
international treaties and agreements. Thus, the Federal Aviation Act and
the National Aeronautics and Space Act would override conflicting provisions of earlier international air agreements and treaties to which the United
States is a party. Of course, international law provides that any abrogation
of an international treaty obligation by domestic law will not automatically
make such action legitimate and will not dispose of the question of international liability for such action.
(d) "State of the Art" Caveat
The preceding analysis of the legal nature of the shuttle suggests that the
shuttle is basically a spacecraft and therefore the rules of space law, not air
law, should apply to it. Clear as this conclusion appears to be, one should
not lose sight of the counter argument that air law ought to apply to the
shuttle during such time as it falls under the definition of "aircraft." Certainly, it would be prudent at the present stage of shuttle development to
draft rules, both domestically and internationally, for appropriate traffic
control and safety procedures, particularly relating to the descent of the
shuttle, when collisions with conventional aircraft may occur.
Finally, it should be stressed that the preceding analysis of the legal
nature of the shuttle pertains to the present state of the art of aerospace
technology. Should future technological developments create an aerospace
vehicle capable of moving freely in the air like an aircraft and also of
moving at will in outer space, the whole range of variables distinguishing air
law from space law and the applicability of these laws to given situations
may have to be reexamined. Additionally, the development of new law,
domestic and international, may become necessary in order to adjust legal
regulations to the latest scientific and technological innovations.
II. Problems of Jurisdiction
The jurisdictional problems which may arise in connection with the use of
the shuttle are not necessarily unique to the shuttle. Such problems may
present themselves in the operation of other types of spacecraft. However,
the shuttle is different from other spacecrafts in its ability to transport a
space lab and separate from it while in outer space. This capability places
some of the jurisdictional problems in immediate perspective. If the shuttle
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carries a space lab or any other space object registered to a foreign state,
questions pertaining to the jurisdiction and control over such space lab or
space object will arise. The major controlling agreement pertaining to jurisdiction and control is the Outer Space Treaty, which provides that the state
party on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall
retain jurisdiction and control over such object and any of its personnel
while in outer space. 2" There can be little doubt that both the foreign registered space lab and the shuttle are space objects. Thus, in the absence of an
international agreement providing otherwise, each state would have jurisdiction and control over its space object and the personnel thereof. However, it is difficult to see how the space lab, including its commander and
crew, could be regarded as being under the sole jurisdiction and control of
the state of registry while the space lab is physically within the confines of
the shuttle. In such a situation, it would be preferable to regard the space
lab and its personnel as remaining under the jurisdiction and control of the
shuttle commander in such matters as ultimate mission control, while being
under the jurisdiction and control of the space lab commander in matters
relating to the operation of the space lab. This position is supported by the
argument that the Outer Space Treaty does not necessarily create exclusive
jurisdiction for the state of registry, 2' and also by the argument that the
space lab is a space object within a space object until its separation from the
shuttle. At any rate, it would be prudent for foreign shuttle users to clarify
the question of jurisdiction and control through international agreements.
In American domestic law, the shuttle commander's authority may be
traced to the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. The regulations
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration extend to disciplinary actions. 2 While the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty have become
the supreme law of the land, there has been no implementing legislation by
Congress relating to jurisdiction and control. It may be particularly useful
to adopt domestic legislation dealing with jurisdiction over criminal acts
committed aboard the shuttle. Such legislation might be similar to bills
already proposed in Congress.23
I11.

Liability Problems

As with problems of jurisdiction, issues of liability are not unique to the
space shuttle. However, the impending utilization of the shuttle gives
greater urgency to their consideration. It would be difficult, if not impossi-

2

Outer Space Treaty, art. VIII, supra note 14.
"See GOROVE, supra note 19, at 144.
"For details, see Mossinghoff & Sloup, supra note 9.
"See for instance S. 1437, 95th Congress which contains proposed revisions of Title 18 of the
U.S. Criminal Code, inter alia, extending U.S. criminal jurisdiction to specific offenses committed in outer space (section 203(c), 204). Under the proposed bill an "aircraft" is defined as
"any craft used or designed for flight or navigation in air or in space" (section 111).
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ble, to indicate all the different situations which may arise in the course of
shuttle operations. This analysis is consequently limited to a few examples
which are indicative of the type and scope of problems that might be encountered.
For purposes of illustration, two types of situations may be singled
out: (a) situations involving a claim against a launching state, and (b) situations involving claims against entities other than launching states.
(a) Claims Against the Launching State
For purposes of discussion, let us assume that a foreign state procures the
launching of its space lab in the shuttle and a national of the United States
suffers an in-flight injury related to the launch of the foreign lab. Two
questions arise: first, could the American national recover against the foreign state? Second, if so, could the foreign state bring a claim for indemnification against the United States Government? The answer to these questions requires a consideration of the provisions of the Liability Convention.
Under the Convention, both the United States and the foreign state would
be regarded as launching states since both the state which launches and the
state which procures the launch are regarded as launching states." Under
the same Convention, a launching state is liable for damage caused by a
space object. However, the provisions of the Convention do not apply to
damage caused by a space object of a launching state to "nationals of that
launching state." 25 In view of these stipulations, it would appear that the
American national's claim may be presented through governmental channels against the foreign state which procured the launching. If so, the
American national may recover against the foreign state.
The answer to the question of indemnification is more elusive in view of
the Convention's inapplicability to damage caused by a space object of a
launching state to nationals of that launching state. 26 However, the foreign
state which procures the launching should be able to present a claim for
indemnification against the United States Government in the absence of any
international agreement to the contrary.27 This conclusion is supported by a
strict interpretation of the Liability Convention when it speaks of damage
caused by a space object of a launching state to nationals of "that launching
state." 28 It could also be argued that the presentation of a claim on behalf
of a national is discretionary with the national's government and that it
would be unlikely that a permanent American resident's claim would be
presented by anyone other than the United States Government.29

2

'Liability Convention, art. l(c)i, supra note 12.
art. VII(a).
,Id.
2
'Id. art. V(2).
"Id. art. VII(a).
2
"Id. art. Viii(3).

2
'Id.
2
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(b) Claims Against Entities Other
than Launching States
With respect to claims against entities other than launching states, two
situations deserve attention. First, if the claim is brought for damage or
injury caused by an American national, it would appear that the traditional
tort law requirements of proof of negligence, proximate causation and
damage will govern liability unless the courts regard the shuttle as an inherently dangerous instrumentality and impose strict liability. This hypothetical case assumes that the damage or injury would occur while the
American national or his agent is within the confines of the shuttle. If the
shuttle operations are confined to a federal enclave at take-off and landing,
federal tort law would be applicable."
The second situation involving claims against entities other than launching states occurs when the claim is against a foreign national. In that case,
the same rule would appear to apply if the place of the damage or injury is
within the shuttle.
Where claims against American and foreign nationals are involved, a
further problem may be presented if the damage or injury takes place within
a foreign-registered space lab which is within the shuttle when the damage
or injury occurs. In such situations, questions of liability would arguably be
governed by the laws of the state to which the space lab is registered. Of
course, this would be the case in all situations after the separation of the
foreign-registered space lab from the shuttle.
Many other issues of liability may arise from the utilization of the shuttle,
including interparty, payload and product liability and a host of others
which fall beyond the scope of this assessment.
IV. Problems of Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights
Inasmuch as the shuttle is expected to be the harbinger of a system of
routine space transportation, the placement of industries and other manufacturing activities in space must be regarded as a likely development.'
With the establishment of industries and other space habitats, the questions
of sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and control may be expected to
once again become preeminent, particularly with respect to settlements in
free space."

3

See Dula, supra note 5, at 748ff.
See S. Gorove, The Future of Space Law: A Legal Regime for Space Colonies, in STUDIES
IN SPACE LAW: ITS CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 213 (1977).
"For a detailed discussion of the problem of sovereignty and sovereign rights, see Gorove,
Sovereignty and the Law of Outer Space Re-Examined, 2 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 311 (1977).
3
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It has been assumed by many writers and commentators that sovereignty
has been abolished in relation to outer space. 3" In support of this contention, reference has been made to Article II of the Outer Space Treaty of
1967. This Article provides that outer space shall not be subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by use or occupation, or by any
other means. However, upon close examination, it appears that the quoted
provision prohibits only "national appropriation" and not the exercise of
sovereign rights unrelated to national appropriation.3" This interpretation is
based on the exact language of the treaty and is in complete accord with
other provisions of the treaty that clearly stipulate that the state party on
whose registry an object is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over
the object and its personnel while in outer space."
In view of the preceding considerations and in the absence of an international agreement to the contrary, a settlement built in free space out of earth
materials launched by the state of registry would remain under the unimpaired jurisdiction and control of the state of registry.3 6 This conclusion is
reinforced by another provision of the Outer Space Treaty which makes
states internationally responsible for national activities in outer space. 37 It is
difficult to see how a state could be internationally liable if it had no
jurisdictional authority and could not exercise control over the space object
and its personnel. A similar conclusion follows from an examination of the
Liability Convention's provision making the launching state liable for damage caused by its space object.38 It seems improbable that a state could be
held responsible for such damage if it could not exercise its sovereign prerogatives of jurisdiction and control over its object in outer space. In addition, both the Rescue Agreement and the Registration Convention are predicated on the idea that the state has the right to exercise supreme authority
over its people, institutions and objects in outer space.
Some commentators have asserted that the ban on national appropriation
applies to areas of outer space and to the moon and other celestial bodies
but does not apply to the natural resources of these bodies. 39 If the ban on
appropriation of areas of outer space was strictly interpreted, a state would
not be permitted to appropriate the "area" occupied by its habitat in free

"See, for instance, Adams, The Outer Space Treaty: An Interpretation in Light of the
No-Sovereignty Provision, 9 HARV. INT'L L.J. 140 (1965); Galloway, Response to Participants' Comments: Developments in Space Law, in E. Steinhoff, THE EAGLE HAS RETURNED,
43 AM. ASTRONAUTICAL SOC. Sci. & TEACH. SER. 237 (1976). See also Finch, Response to
"Developments in Space Law", id. at 220.
"S. GOROVE, supra note 19, at 45.
"Outer Space Treaty, art ViII, supra note 14.
"Gorove, supra note 31, at 321.
'Outer Space Treaty, art. VI, supra note 14.
" Liability Convention, arts. 11,III, supra note 12.
"See for instance, the comments made by Goedhuis in the Report of 54th Conference of the
International Law Association 427 (1971).
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space. It would have to be determined whether the physical presence of a
structure at a relatively stable, Lagrangian, point in free space constitutes
"appropriation" and whether such a structure would be regarded as occupying an "area."
While exclusive and "permanent" dominion and control normally constitute appropriation,"0 and any physical structure would, by necessity, have
to occupy an area of space, nonetheless it is doubtful that "area" could
reasonably be interpreted to apply to free space. If it were so interpreted,
one of the cardinal principles of the Outer Space Treaty-the principle of
free exploration and use '-would become meaningless, since no spacecraft
could occupy any part of free space for any length of time. Thus, in the
absence of an international agreement to the contrary, the placement of a
habitat in free space would not constitute an act of national appropriation
any more than a satellite in geostationary orbit violates the Outer Space
Treaty.'
V. Final Observations
The space shuttle heralds the birth of a space transportation system that is
expected to be followed by industrialization and by the eventual establishment of human settlements in space. The advent of this new era provides a
challenge to those concerned with the interpretation of existing law and the
making of new laws that will be applicable to situations arising in a radically
different environment.
The law of the space shuttle will be part of a growing body of laws which
could not be fully discussed within the limited confines of this assessment.
Nonetheless, the preceding discussion of the legal nature of the shuttle, of
the problems of jurisdiction and liability, and of the question of sovereignty
and sovereign rights should, and hopefully will, serve as an impetus for
further discussion and analysis of the legal problems that are likely to arise
with each step man takes in the exploration and use of outer space.
STEPHEN GOROVE

'"S.GOROVE, supra note 19, at 82-83.
"Outer Space Treaty, art. I, supra note 14.
"S. GOROVE, supra note 31, at 320.

